Private information retrieval (PIR) is the problem of retrieving as efficiently as possible, one out of messages from non-communicating replicated databases (each holds all messages) while keeping the identity of the desired message index a secret from each individual database. Symmetric PIR (SPIR) is a generalization of PIR to include the requirement that beyond the desired message, the user learns nothing about the other − 1 messages. The information theoretic capacity of SPIR (equivalently, the reciprocal of minimum download cost) is the maximum number of bits of desired information that can be privately retrieved per bit of downloaded information. We show that the capacity of SPIR is 1 − 1/ regardless of the number of messages , if the databases have access to common randomness (not available to the user) that is independent of the messages, in the amount that is at least 1/( − 1) bits per desired message bit, and zero otherwise.
I. INTRODUCTION
The private information retrieval (PIR) problem [1] , [2] seeks the most efficient way for a user to retrieve a desired message from a set of distributed databases, each of which stores all the messages, without revealing any information about which message is being retrieved to any individual database. This seemingly impossible mission has a trivial (expensive) solution, i.e., the user can request all the messages to hide his interest. The goal of the PIR problem is to find the most efficient solution. The capacity of PIR is defined as the maximum number of bits of desired message that can be privately downloaded per bit of downloaded information. In our recent work [3] , the capacity of PIR with messages and databases was shown to be PIR = (1 + 1/ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + 1/ −1 ) −1 . The original formulation of PIR only considers the privacy of the user. The privacy of the undesired messages is ignored. However, it is often desirable to restrict the user to retrieve nothing beyond his chosen message. This new constraint is called database privacy, and with this constraint, the problem is called symmetric 1 PIR (SPIR) [4] . Symmetric PIR is especially challenging because the databases must individually learn nothing about the identity of the desired message, but must still collectively allow the user to retrieve his desired message in such a way that the user learns nothing about any other message besides his desired message. For example, the This work is supported in part by funding from ONR grant N00014-16-1-2629 and NSF grants CCF-1617504 and CCF-1317351. 1 Symmetry means that the privacy of both the user and the database is considered. trivial solution of downloading everything, is no longer acceptable. The main contribution of this work is the characterization of the capacity of SPIR, i.e., the maximum number of bits of desired message that can be privately retrieved by a user per bit of downloaded information, without leaking any information about undesired messages to the user. For messages and databases, we show that the capacity is 1 − 1/ .
Besides its direct applications, PIR is especially significant as a fundamental problem that lies at the intersection of several open problems in cryptography [5] , [6] , coding theory [7] , [8] , [9] and complexity theory [10] . SPIR inherits many of these connections from PIR. For example, SPIR is essentially a (distributed) form of oblivious transfer [11] , [12] , where the typical objective is that the transmitter(s) should not know which message is received by the receiver and the receiver should obtain nothing more than the desired message. Oblivious transfer is an important building block (primitive) in cryptography, whose feasibility leads to many other cryptographic protocols [13] , [14] . Fundamental limits on the communication efficiency of various forms of oblivious transfer therefore represent an important class of open problems [15] , [16] . The capacity characterization of SPIR is a promising step in this direction.
Notation: For 1 , 2 ∈ ℤ, 1 ≤ 2 , define the notation
). For an element in the set ℐ = { 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , }, i.e., ∈ ℐ, the notation represents the complement of { }, i.e.,
For two sets 1 , 2 , 1 / 2 represents the set of elements that are in 1 but not in 2 .
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Consider
independent messages 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , of size bits each.
There are databases. Each database stores all the messages 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , . A user wants to retrieve , ∈ [1 : ] privately, i.e., without revealing anything about the message identity, , to any individual database. The databases do not want to give out any information beyond the one message of the user's choosing ( ). In order to achieve database-privacy, we assume that the databases share a common random variable that is not known to the user. It has been shown that without such common randomness, SPIR is not feasible [4] . For a pictorial illustration of an example of the SPIR problem with messages and 2 databases, see Figure 1 .
DB1 DB2
Query Query Answer Answer Without loss of generality, assume that the user chooses a uniformly over [1 : ]. In order to retireve message , the user privately generates queries
Since the desired message index and the queries are determined by the user, who has no knowledge of the realizations of the messages and the common randomness, the queries and the desired message index must be independent of the messages and the common randomness,
The user sends query [ ] to the -th database, ∀ ∈ 
Each database returns to the user its answer [ ] . From all the information that is now available to the user, he must be able to correctly decode the desired message , i.e., the following correctness criterion must be satisfied:
To protect the user's privacy, it must be true that any individual database learns nothing about the desired message index . Information theoretically, must be independent of all the information available to any individual database. Thus, the following user-privacy constraint must be satisfied
Symmetric PIR also requires protecting the privacy of the database, i.e., it must be ensured that the user learns nothing more than the desired message . So the vector
, must be independent of all the information available to the user. Thus, the following database-privacy constraint must be satisfied:
The SPIR rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit, and is defined as follows. 2
The capacity, , is the supremum of over all SPIR schemes.
III. MAIN RESULT: CAPACITY OF SPIR
When there is only = 1 message, note that the databaseprivacy constraint is satisfied trivially, so that SPIR reduces to the PIR setting and the capacity is 1. For ≥ 2, it is known that some common randomness is necessary for the feasibility of SPIR. Let us define as the amount of common randomness relative to the message size
The capacity should depend on , and because availability of common randomness at the databases is a non-trivial requirement, this dependence is of some interest. The following theorem states our main result, the capacity of SPIR. Theorem 1: For SPIR with ≥ 2 messages and databases, the capacity is
The achievability proof appears in Section IV. The converse proof appears in Section V. We notice a surprising threshold phenomenon in the dependence of SPIR capacity, SPIR , on the amount of common randomness . When < 1 −1 , SPIR is not feasible and SPIR = 0. However, when ≥ 1 −1 , SPIR is not only possible, but the rate can immediately be increased to the maximum possible, i.e., the capacity. Therefore, the minimum common randomness required to achieve any positive rate is already sufficient to achieve the capacity of SPIR. A pictorial illustration of the SPIR capacity and its dependency on the amount of common randomness appears in Figure 2 .
Another surprising observation is that the capacity of SPIR is independent of the number of messages, . When the capacity is non-zero, the capacity is strictly increasing in the
number of databases, , and when approaches infinity, the capacity approaches 1. It is interesting to compare the capacity of SPIR and the capacity of PIR [3] ,
We see that the capacity of SPIR is strictly smaller than the capacity of PIR (the additional requirement of preserving database-privacy strictly hurts) and the capacity of PIR approaches the capacity of SPIR when the number of messages, , approaches infinity (in the large number of messages regime, the penalty vanishes), i.e., PIR > SPIR for any finite and PIR → SPIR when → ∞.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we present the scheme that achieves rate 1 − 1/ , when = 1/( − 1). To this end, we assume each message consists of − 1 bits and each answering string is 1 bit. Specifically, we assume = ( ,1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , −1 ), ∀ ∈ [1 : ] where each , , ∈ [1 : − 1] is one bit. We further assume the entropy of the common random variable is 1 bit, i.e., is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Note that is independent of the messages.
Next we specify the queries functions. To retrieve privately, the user first generates a random vector of length
where each element is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Then the queries are set as follows.
The answering strings are generated by using the query vector as the combining coefficients and producing the corresponding linear combination of message bits. We further add the common random variable to each answer. We now show that database-privacy is preserved as well.
( ;
where in each step, the transformation on the variables is invertible such that mutual information remains the same. The last step follows from the independence of the messages and the common randomness. Intuitively, database-privacy is guaranteed because each message bit of the non-desired messages is aligned with the common randomness. Note that because each answering string is 1 bit and the message is = − 1 bits, the rate achieved is ( − 1)/ = 1 − 1/ which matches the capacity. Also note that only the minimum threshold amount of common randomness is utilized, i.e., = 1/( − 1).
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: CONVERSE
For the converse we allow any feasible SPIR scheme, and prove that its rate cannot be larger than SPIR . Let us start with two lemmas that will be used later in the proof.
Lemma 1:
Proof: Since the proofs of (18) and (19) follow from the same arguments, here we will present only the proof of (18). From the User-Privacy constraint we know that ∀ ∈ [1 : ], ( ; [ ] , , [ ] ) = 0. Therefore, we must have ∀ ′ ∈ [1 : ],
But we also know that ∀ ∈ [1 : ], ( , [ ] ; ) = 0, so we must also have
Combining (20) and (21), we obtain
Lemma 2:
Proof: Since
we only need to prove
where the second term in (27) is zero because of (4) and (29) follows from (3).
A. The proof for ≤ SPIR
For every feasible SPIR scheme, we must satisfy the database-privacy constraint,
So we must have ∀ ′ ∈ [1 : ] 0 = ( ′ ;
and
In the last step we used (18) 
(using Lemma 2)
(using (35))
(using (19) in Lemma (1))
Adding (42) for = [1 : ], we have
where (46) follows from the condition ( [ ] ; ) = 0 so that
Thus, the rate of any feasible SPIR scheme cannot be more than SPIR . Remark: The intuition of the outer bound is as follows. Because of user-privacy, the answer from any individual database should be independent of the desired message index. Because of database-privacy, the answer from any individual database should contain no information about the non-desired messages. Combining above two facts, we know that the answer from any individual database should contain no information about any individual message (including the desired one). As a result, the useful information about the desired message can only come from the other − 1 databases. Therefore, each answer should contain at least 1/( −1) of the entropy of the desired message and the outer bound follows.
B. The proof for ≥ 1/(1 − )
Suppose a feasible SPIR scheme exists that achieves a nonzero SPIR rate. Then we will show in this section that it must have ≥ 1/(1 − ). Consider the answering strings [ ] , from which we can decode . From the database-privacy constraint, we have
where (50) follows from the fact that from
we can decode , (51) is due to the independence of the messages, and (54) follows from the fact that the answers are deterministic functions of the queries, all messages and the common random variable. (57) follows from Lemma 2. (58) is obtained because of (35). (59) follows from (19) in Lemma 1.
Adding (59) for ∈ [1 : ], we have
where (62) follows from (44). Thus, the amount of common randomness relative to the message size of any feasible SPIR scheme cannot be less than 1/( − 1). Remark: The intuition of the bound on the amount of common randomness is as follows. From the proof for the rate of SPIR, we know that the average size of the answer from any individual database must be at least 1/( − 1) of the size of the desired message. Because of database-privacy, the answer from each individual database is independent of the messages. Therefore, to protect the answer, the amount of common randomness must be larger than or equal to the size of the answer, so the desired bound follows.
VI. CONCLUSION For messages and databases, the capacity of SPIR was shown to be = 1 − 1/ . In order to achieve any positive rate for SPIR, the minimum amount of common randomness needed among the databases was shown to be 1/( − 1) bits per message bit. Remarkably, this is also sufficient to achieve the capacity of SPIR.
